James P. Knuckles v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, A  Corporation : Brief of Appellant-Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971
James P. Knuckles v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, A Corporation : Brief of Appellant-
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errorsRobert H. Ruggeri; Attorney for Plaintiff Respondent
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Knuckles v. Metro Life Insurance, No. 12254 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/220
-IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of lhe 
STATE 01' 1JTAH 
JAMES P. KNUCKLES 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CASE NO. 
12254 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT - RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff seeks indemnity for loss of sight of an eye under 
a "Group Insurance Certificate" issued by Appellant to em-
ployees of Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, Incorporated. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Lower Court held in favor of Plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmation of Lower Court's decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent agrees generally with the Statement 
of Facts presented by Defendant-Appellant. 
Plaintiff-Respondent does not agree with Defendant-Ap-
pellant's statement that "Plaintiff's injured eye is physiolog-
ically normal except for the loss of the crystalline lens and 
a slight scar on the cornea" and will direct his Statement of 
Facts primarily to this point. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, while working for Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Company as an underground miner with normal vision 
without the use of lenses of any kind (Tr., page 12-15) par-
ticipated in a group life and accident policy purchased by 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company employees from the Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Company. Plaintiff's coverage commenced 
June 12, 1965, and was in effect February 23, 1967, (Tr. page 
7 and Items 1 and 2 of Pre-Trial Order) when the accident 
causing the loss of the sight of his right eye, took place. The 
policy provided, among other things, for the payment to Plain-
tiff-Respondent of $7500.00 in the event he suffered the "total 
and irrecoverable loss of the sight of one eye." (Policy at-
tached to Plaintiff's Complaint as "Exhibit A".) As the direct 
and proximate cause of the injury (Depo. Dr. Robert W. Rigg, 
lines 4, 5, 6, page 20) and in an effort to restore his vision, 
Plaintiff-Respondent submitted to five surgical procedures, 
three to remove the crystalline lens (Dep. James P. Rigg, pages 
4, 18 and 24) and two to correct muscular imbalance caused 
by the injury. ( Dep. Robert W. Rigg, page 8.) 
"Q. So, would you then describe the abnormalties that 
now exist in the eye ? 
"A. The abnormalties are from the standpoint of visual 
acuity. He has approximately 20/800 visual acuity in this eye. 
2 
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-"Q. But physiologically, what is now abnoral, just for 
my information? 
"A. Physiologically, this is an abnormalty ." ( Depo. James 
Rigg, Sr., page 25, lines 12 through 18, as amended.) 
Mr. Blair Kinnersley 
Claim Adjuster 
State Insurance Fund 
215 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
My dear Mr. Kinnersley: 
July 22, 1968 
RE: James Paul Knuckles 
File No. 67-2827 (2) 
Inj: 2-23-67 
It is with deep regret that I did not identify the fact that Mr. 
Knuckles is totally blind in the right eye only. He has adequate 
vision in the left eye - 20/20. The only eye involved in com-
pensation is the right. 
May I graciously thank you for your letter. 
Most sincerely, 
s: James P. Rigg, Sr. M.D. 
JPR:gf " 
(Letter marked Exhibit 2 and identified in the Deposition of 
James P. Rigg. See Rigg's deposition at page 29). 
"Q. Now, would you have an opinion as to whether or 
not a person has lost his eyesight irrevocably because of a cat-
aract operation ? 
3 
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"A. No, you can't say that it's been lost to that extent 
' except if they cannot wear a contact lens or they cannot wear 
a forward lens. Then, it is essentially lost. It's never going to 
be as good as what the good Lord gave you. Nobody would 
deny that." (De po. Robert W. Rigg, page 16, lines 7 through 
14.) 
"A. It's been reported that the average age of a cataract, 
an eye that has had a cataract removed, is about ten years. 
They are more prone to have retinal detachment and other 
conditions of their eyes than the average eye, than a normal 
eye, I should say." Depa. Robert W. Rigg, page 19, lines 
19 through 23.) 
"A. Only two things: he was injured in the eye, he had 
a blow in the eye, and he's had a cataract develop in the eye. 
It's an abnormal condition from the first and one which may 
have other problems. This is a known fact by all ophthalmol-
ogists and it will be verified by anybody, I'm sure." ( Depo. 
Robert W. Rigg, page 21, lines 13 through 17.) 
"Q. Would you have an opinion whether or not the loss 
of his eye without correction is irrecoverable? 
"A. Oh, for certain. 
"Q. I mean, is there anything - what I'm trying to get 
at doctor, is there anything more that surgery or medication 
could do that would result in that eye perceiving things more 
clearly? 
"A. No, there's nothing. There is no other means except 
artificial unless you wait for the resurrection." ( Dep. Dr. Ro-
bert W. Rigg, page 1 7, lines 1-10.) ( Dep. Dr. Merrill, page 
7, lines 13 through 15 and page 20, lines 7 through 11.) 
"Well, the opinion without a lens is about five four-hun-
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dreths, or it's almost useless vision." ( Depo. Dr. Merrill, page 
5, line 21.) 
When not wearing a contact lens the Plaintiff-Respondent 
has, for all practical purposes, lost the sight of his ~ight eye. 
Using the injured eye without a contact lens (Depo. Dr. Mer-
rill, page 20, lines 7 through 11, vage 22, lines 1 through 7) 
he could not drive a car, watch television, see a football game, 
fish, sight a gun, or take care of his many needs. (Depo. James 
P. Rigg, pages 1, 4 and 35.) ( Depo. Robert W. Rigg, page 
18.) ( Depo. Dr. Merrill, page 6, lines 6 through 15.) 
"A. Uncomfortable to wear, but there again some people 
are more motivated than other people. Some people can't 
wear a contact lens, in normal condition, whereas other peo-
ple can wear them in practically any kind of condition." 
( Dcpo. Dr. Merill, page 10, lines 20 through 23.) Plaintiff's 
vision is substantially improved and by medical standards 
can be corrected to 20/20 minus 3 visual acquity when wear-
ing contact and forward lenses. Medical testimony substan-
tiates the fact that not all people can wear contact lens. ( Depo. 
Robert W. Rigg, page 16, lines 21, 22.) (Tr. Dr. Ronald H. 
Merrill, page 37, lines 14-20.) Plaintiff testified he _has been 
unable to wear the contact lens prescribed for him because of 
irritation to the eye. (Tr. pages 15, 16) although the lens had 
been re-worked to make it more comfortable. (Depo. Robert 
W. Rigg, page 9, lines 14, 15.) 
See Findings of Fact prepared by Trial Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Plaintiff-Respondent did suffer the "total and irre-
5 
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coberable loss of the sight" of his right eye within the mean. 
ing of the policy and the applicable laws. 
45 C. J. S., Paragraph 900, page 986: 
"c. Loss of Sight 
"Provisions in accident policies for the payment of spec-
ified indemnity for loss of sight are liberally construed 
in favor of the insured, and within such provisions there 
is an entire loss of sight, although sight is not completely 
destroyed, if what sight is left is of no practical use or 
benefit. 
''The term "irrecoverable and entire loss of sight" as useJ 
in accident insurance policies providing for specified in-
demnity therefore should be liberally construed in favor 
of insured, and the construction to be placed on this 
term is not aff ectecl by the fact that the policy also pro-
vides for weekly indemnity payments for other accidental 
injuries not otherwise specifically enumerated. So a pro-
vision for indemnity for loss of sight is not qualified by a 
separate provision in the policy for indemnity in case of 
total disability. Although sight is not completely destroy-
ed, there is a "loss of entire sight" or an "entire loss of 
sight" within an accident policy if what sight is left is of 
no practical use or benefit. Practical use does not mean 
use in a particular calling or occupation, but rather that 
use which will render practical service with respect to 
many needs and pleasures, and the mere fact that insur· 
ed could not advantageously use his eye in his work or 
in reading is not sufficient to entitle him to recover for 
entire loss of sight. Inability to use both eyes simultan· 
eously constitutes loss of the practical use of one eye. 
Whether there is a loss of the practical use of an eye 
when peripheral vision exists depends on the facts of 
each individual case.**" 
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44 Am Jur 2d s 1604, page 494: 
"s 1604. Loss of eyes or eyesight. 
"Under policies merely insuring against loss of sight, there 
is no necessity that the eye be so physically damaged 
that it must be removed, although a policy may expressly 
require the physical removal of the eye. However, where 
the insured has sustained a loss of sight or of useful sight, 
the courts are not in agreeme'nt as to whether the insured 
has lost his sight within the meaning of the policy where 
his vision can be restored by a surgical operation or by 
the use of glasses, or where the insured has retained or 
regained usable vision in his injured eye, although he has 
suffered a loss of binocular vision so that he can use one 
eye or the other but cannot use them both together." 
78 A. L. R. 2d 488: 
"Loss of useful sight as test. Whether the policy insures 
against loss of sight, loss of entire sight, or entire loss of 
sight, or whether it refers to blindness or total blindness, 
it is generally interpreted to mean loss of practical use 
of sight rather than literal blindness." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah is committed 
to the reasonable and responsible interpretation of "loss of 
sight" and has repeatedly declared that a contract of insur-
ance will be construed in such a way as to give practical ef-
fect to its terms and conditions. 
MAYNARD v. LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS MUTUAL 
LIFE AND ACCIDENT INS. ASSN. 
Supreme Court of Utah, November 4, 1897 
16 Utah 145; 51 P 259 
In holding that total and permanent loss of the sight of 
one eye entitles insured to recover for the "total and perma-
nent loss of eyesight" where such injury disables him from 
pursuing his usual and accustomed occupation, the Court said : 
7 
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"**The terms of the by-law in question must be inter-
preted liberally and reasonably, and as they appear to be 
susceptible of two constructions, that must be adopted 
which will more nearly carry out the benign object of 
the association, and sustain the claim of the injured. The 
provisions will not be scrutinized for the purpose of en-
abling the organization to escape liability to any of its 
members, or for the purpose of creating limitations, in 
favor of the association, which do not satisfactorily ap-
pear within the terms of the by-law. Where associations 
or corporations are organized for the purpose of mutual 
benefit and relief, their by-laws will not be so interpret-
ed as to favor the forfeiture of the rights of its mem-
bers or those dependent upon them. The by-laws of mu-
tual benefit societies should be construed liberally, <:ia<l 
with a view to effectuate the benevolent purposes of their 
organization. When there is any ambiguity or inconsis-
tency in .the terms of such by-laws, that construction 
should be given to them which is most favorable to the 
rights of the members. Nibl. Ben. Soc & Acc. Ins. ss 17, 
143; Bae. Ben Soc. s 86; Insurance Co. v. ~,fond, 102 Pa, 
St. 89; Burkhard v. Insurance Co., Id 262; Humphreys 
v. Association, 139 Pa. St. 264 ; 20 Atl. 104 7 ; Hoff m8n 
v. Insurance Co. 32 N. Y. 405." 
CLARK v. STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COM-
PANY OF DETROIT 
District Court of Appeals, Second District Division 1, Calif. 
(1941) 
43 C. A. 563; 111 P 2d 354. 
The appellate court found that the trial court's finding 
of fact that the Plaintiff lost entire sight of the right eye was 
not supported by the evidence and remanded the case for new 
trial. In doing so the court stated: 
8 
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"It is true that it has been held that the terms irrecover-
able and "entire loss of sight" as used· in insurance pol-
icies should be liberally construed in favor of the insured 
and that a person need not therefore be totally blind to 
recover indemnity for an irrecoverable and entire loss ot 
sight. Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Terrill, 4 Cir. 29 
Fd 460; Locomotive Engineers' Mut. Life & Acc. Ins. 
Co. v. Meeks, 157 Miss 97; 127 South 699, 702; Inter-
national Travelers Ass'n v. Rogers, Tex Clv. App. 163, 
S. W. 421; Tracey v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 119 
Me 131, 109 Atl 490, 9 A. L. R. 521, and other num-
erous decisions many of which haYe been cited by appel-
lant. 
"Under the liberal construction of the terms of a p:--licy 
providing indemnity for irrecoverable and entire loss of 
sight, as above noted, the determination of loss of sight 
is based upon the practical use to which the injured ey<' 
may be put. See International Travelers Ass'n. v. Rogers 
supra; Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Terrill, supra; 
Murray v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., D. C. 243, F 285. 
Practical use does not necessarily mean use in a partic-
ular calling or occupation, but rather that use which will 
render practical service in respect to many needs and 
pleasures. See Murray v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. supra. While 
there is some authority holding that practical use is not 
the test, such decifions appear to be based on a literal 
construction of the term "entire loss of sight" hence und-
er a liberal interpretation, the loss of practical use of 
the eye appears to be the equivalent of the loss of the 
"entire" sight of the eye, as that term is used in the pol-
icy of insurance here in question. The fact that a policy 
provides for disabilities in addition to those specifically 
enumerated should not, as argued by appellant, alter the 
construction to be placed on the provision for loss of 
sight." 
9 
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CLARK v. STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO. 
OF DETROIT 
43 C. A. 2d 563 ; 112 P 2d 298 
This case denied rehearing of 111 P 2d 354 supra. In de-
nying rehearing the Court said: 
"The plea.dings herein presented two qur"<;tions for the 
trial. First: Had appellant actually lost tl1e entir~ si!!l1t 
of the eye, and second: If appellant had not actually lost 
the entire sight of the eye, had the vision been so greatly 
impared as to destroy the practkal use of the eye. 
"It may be well to state here, also, that in view of the 
undisputed evidence of the existence of peripheral yis-
ion in the injured eye, whether practical use of the eye 
h<l:S been lost presents a very close question. See Powers 
v. Motor Wheel Corporation, 252 Mi.ch 639; 234 N. W. 
122; 73 A. L. R. 702. However, where questions of this 
nature arise, their determination depends so much upon 
the facts of each individual case that it would create a 
dangerous and undoubtedly harsh precedent to establish, 
as a rule of law, that the existence of peripheral vision in 
every case constituted existence of practical use of eye-
sight." 
JAMES DWIGHT TRACEY v. STANDARD ACCIDENT 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
119 Me. 131; 109 Atl. 490; 9 A. L. R. 521 
This case, among other things, revolved on the follow-
ing question : 
"5. Did he lose the entire sight of his eye? **The phrase 
"loss of entire sight" should be so construed as to give 
the Plaintiff what he bought and paid for, and not to 
def eat the whole purpose and intent of this contract. It 
should be held to mean that the entire loss of the use of 
the eye from blindness is a loss of the entire sight of that 
10 
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eye. But if technicalities were to be invoked, then the 
meaning of the word "sight" becomes as important as 
the meaning of the word "entire." "Sight" is defined in 
Wester's Standard Dictionary: 1. The power of seeing 
the faculty of vision or perceiving objects. 2. Act of see-
ing; perception of objects by the instrumentality of the 
eyes; view. "To see" is defined: to perceive with the eye; 
to have knowledge of the existence and apparent quali-
ties of by the organs of sight; to examine with the eyes; 
to behold; descry; view; observe; inspect." 
POINT II 
The fact that the Plaintiff's blindness can be temporarily 
corrected during the times that the artifical means are in ac-
tual use does not restore the "total and irrecoverable loss of 
sight" of his right eye, nor does it alter the terms of his insur-
ance contract providing for payment of the loss of sight which 
he has sustained. 
WESTERN CONTRACTING CORPORATION, et al v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, et al. 
Supreme Court of Utah 1964 
15 Utah 2d 208; 390 P 2d 125 
"Original proceeding for review of an award of the In-
dustrial Commission. The Supreme Court, Wade J., held 
that Industrial Commission's award of statutory 100 
weeks' compensation for total blindness of one eye, a sub-
stantial function of which was restored by the use of 
optical lens, could not be held capricious, arbitrary, or 
unreasonable and it would be affirmed." 
The Court stated : Many of the losses separately sched-
uled in this statute are much more similar than these, 
and the legislature, had it so intended could easily have 
11 
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scheduled two different losses, one for total blindness of 
one eye and one for such total blindness which coulJ be 
substantially restored by an artifical lens." 
GOODYEAR SERVICE STORE, et al vs. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, et al. 
Supreme Court of Utah, July 31, 1968 
21 Utah 2d 249; 444 P 2d 119 
In this case the claimant had suffered an eye injury that 
resulted in the loss of vision of his eye uncorrected. 
"Dr. Smith reported to the Commission on July 18, 1966, 
that the operation had been performed with good result. 
He stated that with the use of glasses Mr. Dowdle had 
satisfactory vision in all fields of gaze, but that without 
them double vision continued with the same deficiency 
he had stated before, to-wit: But without his glasses he 
has visual efficiency loss of one eye. Without his glasses, 
this would then represent a 25 percent loss of binocular 
visual efficiency, with 100 percent visual efficiency loss 
of one eye." 
The Court, in holding that the injured party was en-
titled to receive full compensation for the loss of the sight of 
his one eye, stated as follows: 
" ( 1) Whether a 100 percent loss of the visual efficiency 
of one eye is due to the inability of the lens of that eye 
to further function, or is the result of an injury to the 
muscles of the eye that provide motility, thus resulting 
in loss of vision by diplopia, the result appears to be the 
same - the patient has a loss of total vision equivalent 
l f · l ff. · f ***" to 100 percent oss o v1sua e 1ciency o one eye. 
12 
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McCULLOUGH v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELE-
PHONE CO. 
Supreme Court of Kansas 1942 
155 Kan 629; 127 P 2d 467 
This is an industrial case where the Plaintiff lost the 
sight of his eyes which vision could be substantially restored 
by artifical appliances. The Court said: 
"We have no case in our state suggesting that compen-
sation for the loss of a leg, for the arm, hand, or other 
member of thebody, where such compensation is provid-
ed by the schedule, should be decreased by the use of 
an artifical limb, or that a partial loss of such a mem-
ber should decrease the compensation because of braces 
or other artifical appliances. We are cited no case from 
other jurisdictions so holding, and our own research has 
disclosed none. **A further reason, if one be needed, is 
that the use of glasses would not restore the lens of the 
eye lost by the in jury Plaintiff received in this case - the 
physical in jury is not cured by the use of glasser as a 
hernia would be cured by a successful operation." 
OTOE FOOD PRODUCTS CO. v. GRUISKHANK 
Supreme Court of Nebraska 
141 Neb 298; 3 NW 2d 452 
"The Plaintiff received an eye m1ury to his right eye 
that left him with peripheral vision and without the aid 
glasses and that with glasses the eye could be corrected 
to 97 % normal. 
"Issue: Whether or not, under the Nebraska Industrial 
Act the court should take into consideration in "determ-
ining the loss of vision of an eye or eyes, the fact that 
vision may be restored or corrected in part or in whole, 
by the use of glasses. **We should not, by construction, 
put into a law provisions which it does not contain, nor 
13 
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read into it a meaning not intended by the legislature 
If the act is faulty, the correction should be made by the 
legislature and not by the court. We see no more logic 
in holding that the legislature intended to ha:-:e disability 
in an eye case on the condition of the eye after correc-
tion, than in a leg or arm case where compensation should 
be awarded on the extent of disability after attachment 
of a brace or other appliance. The fact that glasses are 
required to restore vision is evidence of the permanency 
of the injury and whether artifical means may partially 
or even wholly restore sight, it nevertheless cannot obli-
terate the effect of the accident causing the injury." 
POCAHONTAS FUEL CO. v. WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION APPEAL BOARD 
118 W. Va. 565; 191 S E 49 
"Subsection ( e) of Sec. 6, Art 4, Chapter 23 of the Cock 
provides : ( e) The total loss of one eye, or the total and 
irrecoverable loss in the sight thereof shall be considered 
a thirty-three percent disabi.lity**. The only question pre-
sented on this appeal is whether, under subsection ( e) 
the claimant shall be compensated for the loss of vision 
with correction by the use of glasses or without such cor-
rection. An examination of the authorities would seem 
to indicate that a conflict of authority exists among the 
courts of the country. 99 A. L. R. 716; 24 A. L. R. 1469; 
8 A. L. R. 1330. This conflict of authority is more ap-
parent than real. Many of the cases are founded upon 
statutes based upon the theory that compensation was 
payable only when the accident led to a loss of earning 
power. The West Virginia statute provides for compen-
sation for loss of eye or vision, total or partial, attribut-
able to a permanent injury. Nothing in the statute indi-
cates an intention on the part of the legislature that 1glass-· 
es or corrective lens should be considered in determining 
the loss of the whole or a fractional part of the vision 
of an eye. **The position is amply sustained by authority." 
14 
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GROF v. NATIONAL STEEL PRODUCTS CO., et al 
225 Mo. App. 702; 38 W. 2d 518 
"It was well said in the case of Allessandro Petrillo Co. 
v. Marioni, 3 W. N. Harr ( 33 Del) 99; A. 164, 165; It 
may be true that an artifical instrumentality, such as 
glasses or a conective lens may subsequently be used by 
virtue of which the loss of vision may be reduced from 
80 percent to 10 percent during the time such glasses are 
actually in use, but the loss suffered by the injury re-
mains the same and is the compensable basis. 
"If 80 percent of the vision of an eye is destroyed in an 
acicdent and yet the injured person while actually using 
specially prepared glasses can obtain normal sight, can 
it be successfully contended that no loss or injury at all 
has been sustained? Such a position is indeed difficult 
to maintain. 
"The very fact that artifical instrumentalities such as 
glasses, braces, and artifical limbs are necessary to be 
used, is in itself evidence of the permanency of the injury, 
but the use of the mechanism itself, although it may al-
low a mernber to function with entire normality, yet it 
cannot obliterate the effect of the accident causing the 
injury." 
MARYLAND REFINING CO., et al vs. COLBOUGH, et al 
110 Okl 238; 238 P 831 
"The State Industrial Commission is not required, under 
the Workmans Compensation Act, to take into consider-
atio that the effect of a permanent injury to the eye 
might be minimized by artifical means in fixing the 
award for such permanent injury." 
To the same effect: 168 Okla 96; 31 P 2d 925 
McDONALD v. STATE TREASURER, et al 
52 Idaho 535; 16 P 2d 988 
"It is the contention of appellant that the use of glasses 
15 
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cannot be taken into consideration in det":rminincr whe-
ther appellant is industrially blind or in determining hi<; 
compensation. There is a conflict of authority upon this 
question, ;is a rcsdt, in some judisdiction·:, or statu'~!.ry 
provisions relat:ng to thP use of artifical zpp~iance;;. We 
have no such statute and are of the opinion that the 
weight of authority and the better rule in the absence of 
statute sustain appellant's contention." 
None of the arguments made by the Defendant Appel-
lant hold up under examination. 
In Defendant-Appellant's Points I and IV he states that 
the instant case involves no factual issues and the Court is 
obligated to determine the legal question involved. 
Plaintiff Respondent has no quarrel with Defendant Ap-
pelant's contention that the Court must decide the le~al ques-
tion in view of the following facts : 
1. A good healthy, young eye was destroyed in an indus-
trial accident while an insurance policy insuring industrial 
employees eyes, including the Plaintiff's eye, was in effect 
and the premium paid. 
2. The Plaintiff's right eye was rendered essentially use-
less and of no practical value except during times when a 
specially prepared contact lens is in actual use. 
3. Not all persons can wear a contact lens. (Medical 
testimony of all three medical experts whose testimony is in 
~vidence.) 
4. Plaintiff has testified that he has been unable to wear 
his contact lens without pain and irritation. 
5. The prognosis for the life of the injured eye is 10 years. 
Applying these undisputed facts the Appellate Court 
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should have little trouble in affirming the trial court's de-
termination of the single question of law the Defendant Ap-
pellant refers to. 
Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the reasoning of the 
various Supreme Courts in industrial cases is applicable in 
non-industrial commission cases, interpreting such words as 
"total and irrecoverable loss of sight," "loss of entire sight," 
"entire loss of sight," "total blindness." When a person is in-
sured against loss of sight, he should be compensated for such 
loss when an injury res~lts in the practical loss of his sight. 
It is spurious to argue that the Plaintiff-Respondent has "re-
covered" his lost vision because he can see during times that 
an an artifical device, he cannot wear without irritation, is 
in actual use. 
Plaintiff Respondent acknowledges the statement made 
by the Defendent Appellant and supported in 44 Am. Jur 2d, 
page 44 (supra) that "the courts are not in agreement as to 
whether the insured has lost his sight within the meaning of 
the policy where his vision can be restored by surgical opera-
tion or by the use of glasses." The Utah Supreme Court, 
however, appears to be counted among those holding that the 
use of artifical lenses is not "restored" vision when contact 
lenses give temporary relief only. (Maynard v. Locomotive 
Engineers supra) (Western Contracting Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm.) (Goodyear Service v. Industrial Comm. supra). 
Plaintiff Respondent submits that when insurance com-
panies write group policies for industrial concerns like Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Company's mine near Moab, Utah, _that it is 
charged with the duty to so word the contract that it will be 
clearly understood. That the contract should be interpreted 
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so as to carry out the intention of both parties and not mere-
ly the intention of the insurance company that wrote the con-
tract. The same rational applies in this case to the Defendant 
Appellant as it applied to the legislature in the case of West-
ern Contracting Corporation v. Industrial Commission (supra) 
when the Utah Supreme Court said: "The legislature, had 
it so intended, could easily have scheduled two different losses, 
one for total blindness of one eye and one for such total 
blindness which could be substantially restored by an artifical 
contact lens." The Kansas court said it well when it stated 
that the physical in jury is not cured by the use of glasses as a 
hernia would be cured by a successful operation. 
The reasoning of the Tennessee case of Benson v. Grand, 
Lodge of the Brotherhood of Firemen, et al. 54 SW 132 is 
applicable here where the Court stated : "The second assign-
ment of error is not well taken, and is likewise overruled. To 
hold that the P.arties have in contemplation the use of lenses 
would be to add to the contract a term that is not in it.**" 
To paraphrase the Nebraska and Missouri Supreme 
Courts, the very fact that the wearing of a contact lens is 
essential to make it possible for the Plaintiff Respondent to 
have any practical use of his right is the best evidence of the 
permanency of the injury, and explanations and legal argu-
ments of the insurance carrier, no matter how ingenious, do 
not obliterate the effect of the accident causing the injury. 
For Defendant-Appellant to state that "Plaintiff's injured eye 
is physiologically normal except for the loss of the crystalline 
lens and a slight scar on the cornea" in view of the medical 
testimony is equivalent to saying that a leg amputated at the 
anklle is physiologically normal except for the loss of the foot 
and the injury to the leg. To deny recovery in this case re-
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quires a judicial addition to the contract of msurance never 
contemplated. 
In conclusion Plaintiff Respondent quotes Justice Wolfe 
in the case of Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 
94 Utah 532; 72 P 2d 1060, page 1073: 
" ( 9) Insurance policies, while in the nature of written 
contracts, are not prepared after negotiations between the 
parties, to embrace the terms at which the parties have 
arrived in their negotiations. They are prepared before 
hand by the insurer, and the company solicitors then sell 
the insurance idea to the applicant. Normally, the details 
and provisions of the policy are not discussed, except that 
the particular form of policy is best suited to give the 
applicant the protection he seeks. If he reads the policy 
he is generally not in a position to understand its details, 
terms, and meanin~ except that, in the event against 
which he seeks insurance, the company will pay the stip-
ulated sums. He seldom sees the policy until it has been 
issued and is delivered to him. He signs an applicant 
blank in which the policy sought is described either by 
form number or b~r a general designation, pays his pre-
mium, anrl in due course thereafter receives, either from 
the agent or throug-h the mails, his policy. Many of the 
terms and all of its defenses and super-refinements he has 
never heard of and would not understand them if he 
read them. Such fact is evident from the fact that cases 
like this arise where lawers and courts disagree as to what 
such provisions mean. In fact, there are about as many 
different constructions by the courts of terms such as 
those involved here as there are insurance companies is-
suing such policies. For this reason the rule of strictissimi 
juris has been applied almost universally to insurance 
contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many others, has de-
clared in favor of a liberal construction in favor of the 
insured to accomplish the purpose for which the insur-
ance was taken out and for which the premium was paid.'' 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The judgment rendered by the trial court should be af-
firmed. 
Respectively submitted, 
Robert H. Ruggeri 
59 East Cenuter Street 
P. 0. Box 310, Moab, Utah 84532 
Attorney for Plaintiff Respondent 
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